The Committee on the Constitutional System Proposals: Coherence and Dominance by Bobbitt, Philip C.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 2 Article 14
The Committee on the Constitutional System
Proposals: Coherence and Dominance
Philip C. Bobbitt
Copyright c 1989 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Philip C. Bobbitt, The Committee on the Constitutional System Proposals: Coherence and Dominance, 30
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 403 (1989), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/14
THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
PROPOSALS: COHERENCE AND DOMINANCE
PHILIP C. BOBBITT*
I have been a fellow traveler of the Committee on the Constitu-
tional System virtually since its inception; indeed, I believe I was
present when Mr. Cutler first made the speech at the University of
Texas that became, "To Form a Government."1 During all this
time I have never been able to quite free myself from the convic-
tion that his concerns were absolutely right and fundamental to
our era. Nor have I been able to persuade myself that the reforms
that he recommends justify a departure from the framers' concep-
tion. I suppose this is why I was selected to give a critical view of
his proposals and his talk.2
These proposals have been thoroughly debated; there is now a
rich literature on them. Jim Sundquist has written an important
book on the subject,3 and even the Committee's recommendations
are in a small pamphlet that is often excerpted in constitutional
law casebooks.4 The authors of the CCS Report understand all of
the main objections. In fact, a good summary of the predominant
opposition can be found in a paragraph from one of the CCS au-
thors who writes:
[T]here are many thoughtful citizens who think that our present
condition of divided government and the resulting hodgepodge
of national policies is preferable to the consequences of a return
to party government and party cohesion. They accept the
hodgepodge as the best available consensus that can be achieved
among the diverse interest groups that make up so huge and va-
riegated a nation. They see the consensus as conceding enough
* Cooper Ragan Regents Professor of Law, The University of Texas, and Fellow, Nuffield
College, Oxford University.
1. See Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126 (1980).
2. Cutler, Now Is the Time for All Good Men.... 30 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 387 (1989).
3. J. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1986).
4. COMM. ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL Sys., A BICENTENNIAL ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN POLIT-
ICAL STRUCTURE (1987).
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to each group to avoid the degree of divisiveness that would im-
pair the national unity.5
I think I endorse these words. They are a fair summary. So
rather than add to this by restating these conclusions, I want to
offer a different perspective altogether. Like someone talking to a
group of friends, I want to try an idea, see how it comports with
our constitutional sense. I want you to indulge in this thought ex-
periment with me.
Mr. Cutler assumes, and I imagine that most of us assume, that
the President initiates governance through a legislative agenda
that represents the popular will as given to him in his electoral
mandate; but, owing in part to a decline in party loyalty when the
executive and legislative branches are held by the same party, and
in part to the persistence of partisanship when government is di-
vided, the Congress then proceeds to thwart the mandated agenda.
The President can't deliver his program and the result is no legis-
lation, no government, and a thwarting of the popular will. That is
what offends efficiency, accuracy, and popular sovereignty.
I dispute every element of this picture. Assume with me, for a
minute, that the Constitution makes Congress, not the President,
the initiator of legislation and it is the Congress who possess a
mandate directly from the people. Assume that it is the President
who is elected either to channel that flow from Congress or to
thwart and check Congress. This picture accords better, I think,
with the framers' scheme and also with the constitutional vision.
Certainly if you gave a Constitution to someone from another soci-
ety who had never read it and asked him to simply flip through the
pages, he would have no trouble identifying who was the initiator
of the government's agenda. Real power lies in article I, after
which article II is almost an afterthought.
Not only is the Constitution faithful to this scheme, but this
description better accords with reality than the customary picture
that we have of the President leading Congress. It is tempting to
think of the President as the agenda setter and proposer. Franklin
5. Cutler, Party Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 32
(1985).




Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Ronald Reagan have all had ex-
tensive legislative programs. But consider just for a moment the
Johnson and the Reagan experience from the perspective that I
have urged.
Consider Johnson, the parliamentarian for twenty-eight years, a
man who released the very energies of Congress that he had galva-
nized when he was a member of Congress. Recall, for example, the
1957 Civil Rights Act 7 which perhaps was the most important stat-
utory achievement of that period and did not come from the White
House. It was his parliamentary leadership that accounted for his
success, even when he was in the White House. By the same token,
I am inclined to think that Kennedy, like Nixon, was not elected
for his precise policy views, but rather for a vague agenda. Cer-
tainly, I think Reagan was not elected to enact his rather eccentric
platform but rather to check Congress. There was a mood in the
country that Congress had gone too far; that it was taking over
more and more of the responsibilities traditionally exercised by
state governments. The President, as David Stockman learned, was
not the initiator of the process. This is nothing new. The National
Bank was not Washington's idea. The Missouri Compromise was
not Polk's idea. The vision we currently have is distorted by the
few charismatic and powerful Presidents who governed at a time of
intense crisis in this century. They by no means represent the typi-
cal flow.
The consequences of changing your perspective this way is that
it allows you to separate two ideas that the Cutler proposals treat
alike. These ideas are coherence on the one hand and dominance
on the other. Some of the proposals, like the party caucus' or four-
year incumbency,9 go to the issue of coherence. These proposals
seek to focus a party's power in Congress and to correct the diffu-
sion of authority in the two houses. Other proposals, those tying
the Presidency and the Congress together, try to achieve a kind of
dominance. 10 I gather that Mr. Cutler is agnostic about this; he
doesn't say the Presidency has to dominate the Con-
7. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1343, 1861; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975-1975(e), 1995 (1982)).
8. Cutler, supra note 5, at 39.
9. Cutler, supra note 2, at 401-02.
10. Id. at 400-02.
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gress-something that probably follows if the President can dis-
solve Congress and possibly results if the tickets are tied together.
Mr. Cutler is equally comfortable with having a President domi-
nated by Congress, but what he wants to do is link their fates to-
gether and that inevitably leads, I think, to their mutual control, if
you will.
Now, if you free yourself from the illusion of a popular mandate
that is thwarted by Congress, you can see that coherence has posi-
tive benefits that do not, in fact, require domination by one leader
with an electoral mandate who must set the agenda. The absurd
figures for committee and subcommittee chairmanships go to the
coherence issue. Moreover, we can see more clearly what is sacri-
ficed by domination. Curiously, Lloyd Cutler who sees so clearly
and has been so persuasive in getting others to see that we have a
system of shared rather than separated powers is willing to sacri-
fice the benefits of this sharing.
I want to spend just a short time on what those benefits are. The
framers faced a formidable problem of legitimacy. If you do away
with a monarchy, how do you ensure that a mere portion of the
people's mandate legitimates the actions of the state? One of their
solutions was to have three different dimensions of constituency:
the constituency of the representatives, the very different constitu-
ency of the states, and then the completely different national con-
stituency of the Presidency. This overlapping authority captures a
deeply layered endorsement of the people.
If you instead tie these endorsements to just one constituency, so
that one group dominates, and it doesn't really matter which
group, you lose the fullness of the three dimensions of legitimacy
contributing to the full authorization of the government. That's
what is sacrificed by domination achieved through dissolution, or
through forbidding ticket splitting, because if you can't say "no" to
something, then you can't authorize it either. And if you can't au-
thorize it, you can't give it legitimacy. Therefore, one of the things
that these proposals do is to multiply not just the number of losers
but the significance of losing.
Here's what I mean. I am from Texas; for a long time we were a
one-party state. I can't imagine voters ever splitting a ticket in
those days. I usually didn't even know who the Republican candi-
dates were! But I can imagine losing an election. (Actually, we
[Vol. 30:403
COHERENCE AND DOMINANCE
seem to have lost quite a few of them lately). But even when I lost
at the national level, I could feel pretty confident of winning in my
district. I know the Congressman there. He is a good Democrat. He
is not going to be turned out. The Senate races in Texas seem to
be up for grabs. So about half the time I win and about half the
time I lose.
If you link these three elections together, so that the outcomes
are interdependent, I might win some of the time, but when I lost,
I would lose all the way down. What holds for me is true for people
all across the country. Not just in the number of losers although
you can see how that is multiplied, but also in the significance of
losing. Think, for example, about the situation of a Labour Party
member in Britain-a parliamentary system that I think Mr. Cut-
ler may have some sympathy with.1 Once a national election is
lost, they have lost completely. Even now the county councils and
the Greater London Council are being abolished.12 So if you are a
member of the Labour Party, there is no one in the government
who represents you. You have lost at every level.
I think the solution to a second problem that the framers faced
is also sacrificed by this dominance principle; that is, the solution
to the problem posed by the decision to make the people, not the
state, the sovereign. That decision meant that the main constitu-
tional job of government lay in choosing what the government was
going to do, not just how it was going to do it. In our system, be-
cause a problem is not tackled by legislation does not mean that it
has not been addressed by the sovereign. It may have been allo-
cated to some sector of our national life other than Congress or the
Congress may have decided on such an allocation. I think it is in-
teresting that the private 'and state sectors are very seldom ad-
dressed by the Committee for a Constitutional System. But such a
diverse allocation also accords with a system of shared powers in
which everyone, in these different dimensions, must agree that this
is the kind of problem that we want to allocate to the
government. 3
11. See Cutler, supra note 2, at 395.
12. B. HOGWOOD, FROM CRIsIs TO COMPLACENCY? 123, 176-77 (1987).
13. This reminds me of a story that many of you may know. I first heard it from the poet
William Meredith, who claims that he was actually watching television when this happened.
It was the 1952 New Hampshire primary; it was live, some of the first live nationwide broad-
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Perhaps the problem with the budget deficit, for example, is not
simply just that we can't organize Congress to cope with it. Al-
though I think the coherence issue is a very important one, I think
it is also that the public has not yet been persuaded that the
budget is a problem that the Congress can yet appropriately deal
with. They see the Congress-and they are encouraged in this view
by the President-as more the problem than the solution.
Now apart from this thought experiment about premises, I am
also skeptical about the facts, at least the correlations among the
facts on which the argument for party government depends. It is
true the decline in party loyalty has been accompanied by a rise in
divided government, but have these not been merely contempora-
neous events? I sometimes doubt whether they have had a close
causal interrelation. The fact is simply that the Republicans have
captured one electoral dimension-a national dimension. Horace
Busby refers to this as the Republicans having an "electoral lock"
on the White House. 14 If you go back to all the years since Frank-
lin Roosevelt, with the exception of Lyndon Johnson's election, it
does look as though the Republican Party is getting a stronger and
stronger hold on the electoral college.' 5
Moreover, the difference between the dimensions, the national
constituencies as opposed to the state constituencies, as opposed to
the representative constituencies is, I think, of greater significance
than the fact that each may be held by different parties. Certainly
you see this in Texas, where although we long had a one party
state this did not diminish the conflict between the governor and
the legislature.
cast. CBS had sent a reporter up there; they had a camera show a village scene where it was
gently snowing. The reporter was interviewing people as they came down the street. An
elderly woman came by; he stopped her and explained that this was CBS live and that today
was the day of the New Hampshire Primary. The reporter gave a little talk about the impor-
tance of democracy in this country and how nowhere was the franchise more jealously
guarded than in New Hampshire. This woman was standing in the snow during all this.
Finally he said to her: "Have you voted today?" She didn't hear him and he had to repeat
the entire patronizing lecture. He went through the whole speech again, and asked loudly,
"Have you voted today?" And she says, "Voted? No. I never vote; it only encourages them."
14. Barnes, College Counseling, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 18 & 25, 1988, at 13; Will it be
another Republican White House?, A.B.A. BANKING J., Oct. 1988, at 92 (interview with Hor-
ace Busby).
15. Dionne, Predicting the Electoral Vote: Does G.O.P. Have a 'Lock'?, N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 1988, at Al.
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As Mr. Cutler noted, the first year of Ronald Reagan's term was
spectacularly successful despite divided government. 6 This last
year has been spectacularly unsuccessful. But so was Franklin
Roosevelt's in 1944; so was Lyndon Johnson's in 1968, and neither
of them had to endure divided government. I submit that if Presi-
dents Roosevelt and Johnson can't do it, it can't be done. Having
the same party did not save SALT II for Jimmy Carter, and I am
inclined to suspect that having divided government would not have
prevented Gerald Ford from getting SALT II ratified.
Finally, I am skeptical of the claim that stronger parties are
freer from special interests. It seems to me they are simply cap-
tured by larger interests. Certainly this seems to be the case in
Japan and in Great Britain.
The import of these facts, like the premises, are a matter of
speculation. I have given you in this brief time a rather distorted
view of the picture. I am not saying really that Congress alone is
the sole proposer, or that the President does not have an equally
important mandate. I am simply trying to correct, if I can, what I
think is the usual picture.
The biggest problem in constitutional law, like the biggest prob-
lem in nuclear strategy or microeconomics or for all I know biol-
ogy, or physical chemistry, is to escape the impress of the usual
and ordinary ways of looking at things. Because this enterprise re-
quires intellectual courage and a certain impertinence, I was not
surprised to see Mr. Cutler in the vanguard of the reexamination
of our constitutional premises at a time when most lawyers were
content to wrap themselves in bunting. His approach reminds me
of a remark by Grant Gilmore, whom I miss and whose words I
love very much: "No lawyer worthy of the name can ever be either
truly a conservative or truly a radical: at one and the same time we
must devote ourselves to the preservation of tradition, which we do
not greatly respect, and to the promotion of change, in which we
do not greatly believe.
16. Cutler, supra note 2, at 399.
17. G. GmMORE, The Truth About Harvard and Yale, YALE LAW REP., Winter 1963, at 9.
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